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ARGUMENT
I. Respondent Downplays and/or Ignores the Bulk 0f Appellant’s Plead Facts
which Must be Considered as if True under a Rule (12)(6) Motion as Reviewed
de novo by this Court.
Respondent’s Response brief foregoes reciting a “Statement 0f Facts,” but instead
provides a general “Statement 0f the Case” which focuses 0n only a few paragraphs 0f
Appellant/Plaintiff” s complaint, while ignoring most 0f the plaintiff s allegations. Resp. Brief
pp. 1-2. Respondent then suggests that the Appellant/Plaintiff’ s complaint and appeal consists of
“vague assertions” that “it cannot prepare a full response t0.” Id. pp. 2-3.
Such an approach by the Respondent is misleading and suggests that this Court disregard
the standard of review in this case Which is a de novo review of whether the district court’s
granting 0f an IRCP § 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was appropriate because the “non-moving
party would be unable t0 prove any conceivable set 0f facts in support 0f its claim.” Yoakum v.
Hartford Fire Ins. C0., 129 Idaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996). A de novo review allows
this Court to consider this matter “anew; afresh; a second time.” See Black’s Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition. Additionally, this Court “exercises free review over questions of law.
”
Brannon v.
City ofCoeurD'Alene, 153 Idaho 843, 847, 292 P.3d 234, 239 (2012) (citations omitted). Thus,
as clearly set forth and asserted in the Appellant’s Brief, the real issue before this Court is
whether upon taking a fresh 0r second look at the complaint in its entirety and with all inferences
drawn in the favor 0f the Appellant/Plaintiff, has the Appellant plead an actionable claim that can
or should be recognized by law.
This is clearly a perspective that the Respondent would prefer that this Court avoid —
given the comprehensive and shocking allegations made in the complaint, as referred t0 With
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clarity in the Appellant’s Brief. App]. Br. pp. 5-7. R. V01. Ipp. 3 1-35. In summary, the
Plaintiff/Appellant Jackie Raymond (Raymond) alleges that the Defendant/Respondent Idaho
State Police (ISP) — Who was charged with the responsibility With investigating a horrific
accident killing Raymond’s father caused by a Fayette County deputy traveling over 115 MPH
on a residential road — did in fact take measures t0 conceal, destroy 0r otherwise tamper With
evidence and testimony to protect the liability of the deputy and the county, including
suppressing and altering a report by its own investigatory agents finding that the deputy’s actions
were reckless. Id. Raymond further alleges that such actions by the ISP not only interfered With,
delayed and reduced the amount 0f damages that she should have received under her wrongful
death claim, but that ISP’S actions caused severe emotional distress and anxiety and other
general and special damages. Raymond is simply recommending t0 this Court that it exercise a
de nova and free review over whether Idaho does or should recognize a tort for this horrendous
conduct by the ISP and its agents. Viewed in that appropriate light, this Court should grant
Raymond’s appeal.
II. Idaho Recognizes a Third Party Spoliation 0f Evidence Claim, the Concerns 0f
which Expressed by the California Supreme Court in Temple County Hospital
Have Been and Are Easily Diffused.
Respondent attempts to pass of as mere “dicta” the “guidance in future litigation” and
“framework for another cause 0f action” provided by this Court in in Yoakum v. Harzford Fire
Ins. C0., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 P.2d 416, 423 (1996). The Yoakum Court did not allow such a
claim to move forward simply because it held that the alleged facts in that particular case were
not “egregious” enough t0 warrant a claim. Id. However, this Court made it clear as it has in
several other subsequent opinions that it would recognize a third party spoliation claim under the
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right set of facts. Id. See also Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equipment, C0. Ina, 137 Idaho 578,
581-82, 51 P.3d 392, 395-96 (2002) and Cook v. Idaho Department ofTransportation, 133 Idaho
288, 298, 985 P.2d 1150, 1160 (1999). Respondent points to no Idaho authority Which expressly
rejects a third party spoliation claim.
Instead, Respondent relies heavily upon a 1999 California Supreme Court decision
Temple County Hospital v. Superior Court, 20 Ca1.4th 464 (1999), Which determined that
California would n0 longer recognize a third party spoliation cause of action. Again, Idaho has
never referenced 0r relied upon this California decision, Which therefore makes it inapplicable in
this case. Nevertheless, the reasons that the California court provided for not allowing such a
Claim have been debunked and criticized in several other subsequent decisions from other
jurisdictions, including neighboring states such as Montana and Utah.
The Temple County Hospital Court justifies its decision by claiming that recognizing a
cause 0f action for a third party spoliation claim would “produce endless derivative litigation”
and that damages are “irreducibly uncertain.” Id. 20 Cal.4th at 473-76. The Court also suggests
that third party spoliation can be remedied by contempt orders, sanctions, criminal statutes
and/or other yet-to-be fashioned remedies by the California legislature. Id. at 476.
California’s feeble attempt t0 address the troubling implications of third party spoliation
0f evidence has not been accepted or followed by numerous other jurisdictions. Nor have such
jurisdictions allowed the fears expressed by California t0 outweigh the potential harms and
wrongfulness of third party spoliation that an independent cause 0f action would remedy and
deter. A worthy analysis 0f the pros of allowing such a claim is provided by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in two 0f its opinions in 2007 and 2007 respectively.
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In 2006, the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized a tort for first party intentional
spoliation 0f evidence as an independent tort, noting that "the existing nontort remedies are
insufficient to compensate Victims of spoliation and to deter filture spoliation When a first party
defendant destroys evidence intentionally with the purpose and effect of precluding a plaintiff
from fulfilling his burden 0f production in a pending 0r impending case." Rizzuto v. Davidson
Ladders, Ina, 280 Conn. 225, 243, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006). In so doing, the Rizzuto Court
acknowledges other available remedies for spoliation, i.e. sanctions, criminal statutes, etc. .. but
ultimately concluded that such remedies “provide an insufficient compensatory and deterrent
effect” and d0 not “compensate the plaintiff for the loss of his underlying civil action." Id., at
242.
In 2007, the Connecticut Supreme Court also recognized an independent cause 0f action
for a third party intentional spoliation of evidence claim, again rebutting the concerns raised by
California in Temple Community Hospital. Diana v. NetJets Services, Ina, 974 A.2d 841, 849
(Conn.Super. 2007). The Connecticut Court was undeterred by the “irreducible certainty of
damages” argument, stating:
We agree that this difficulty of proof is endemic to the tort of spoliation. . .but we disagree
that it should preclude recognition of the tort... The difficulty in determining the harm
caused by a defendant's spoliation of evidence is attributable solely to the defendant's
intentional bad faith litigation misconduct. If the plaintiff could establish precisely What
the spoliated evidence would have shown, the tort would be unnecessary because the
plaintiff would possess sufficient evidence to satisfy his burden of production in the
underlying litigation.
Id.
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The Connecticut Court further “acknowledges:”
that, [t]he most difficult aspect of a spoliation 0f evidence tort is the calculation 0f
damages.... In determining the proper measure of damages, we are guided by the purpose
of compensatory damages, Which is to restore an injured party to the position he or she
would have been in if the wrong had not been committed... To restore a Victim of
intentional spoliation 0f evidence to the position he or she would have been in if the
spoliation had not occurred, the plaintiff is entitled t0 recover the full amount of
compensatory damages that he or she would have received if the underlying action had
been pursued successfully... We recognize that various jurisdictions have criticized this
measure of damages because there is the potential that the plaintiff would benefit more in
an instance 0f spoliation than he might have in the underlying suit... We conclude,
however, that the risk 0f a Windfall to the plaintiff sufficiently is minimized by requiring
the plaintiff t0 prove that the defendant spoliated evidence intentionally with the purpose
and effect 0f precluding the plaintiffs ability t0 establish a prima facie case in the
underlying litigation and, further, by permitting the defendant t0 rebut the presumption of
liability that arises upon this showing.
Id. at 849 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Connecticut Supreme Court also thoroughly debunks the concern 0f “a spiral 0f
contemporaneous 0r subsequent collateral or satellite litigation based on allegations of spoliating
conduct” warned about in other jurisdictions. Id. The Court “dismissed” this assertion:
with respect to the risk of meritless spoliation actions, we do not agree that recognition
of the tort Will result in an uncontrollable influx of frivolous claims.... [T]he limited scope
0f the tort, the difficulty 0fproof inherent in the tort and the safeguards embodied in our
rules 0f practice are sufficient t0 deter the filing of such meritless actions.
Lastly, the tort of intentional spoliation 0f evidence, as defined in this state, poses no risk
ofjury confusion, inconsistent verdicts 0r duplicative litigation because the underlying
claim and the tort of intentional spoliation 0f evidence are mutually exclusive. In other
words, a plaintiffWho possesses sufficient evidence to present his underlying claim to the
jury necessarily is unable to state a claim for intentional spoliation 0f evidence, and Vice
versa. Thus, the risk ofjury confusion, inconsistent verdicts or duplicative litigation is
eliminated entirely.
Id. at 949-50.
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As further indicated by the Connecticut Supreme Court, a strong argument exists in
particular for a third party spoliation claim due t0 a “lack 0f remedies available to third party
spoliation Victims” noting that:
the evidentiary inference as well as most discovery sanctions are not available when
a person who is not a party t0 the litigation and Who is not an agent of a party
intentionally has destroyed evidence. . .because the nontort remedies for third party
spoliation, unlike those for first party spoliation, are not strong and effective deterrents,
this factor weighs heavily in favor of recognizing a tort remedy for third party
spoliation... Tort law seeks not only t0 deter wrongful conduct but also t0 compensate
those injured by such conduct. The nontort remedies for third party spoliation d0 not,
however, compensate the Victim for the harm caused by the destruction 0f evidence,
unlike the nontort remedies for first party spoliation.
Id. at 85 1.
Finally, in a resounding rejection of the majority ruling in Temple Community Hospital
the Connecticut Supreme Court cites the more sound reasoning found in the dissenting opinion
which states: "Nor would a tort remedy for intentional third party spoliation create ‘endless'
litigation... It would create a single lawsuit between the spoliation Victim and the spoliator....
[T]here is nothing unique about third party spoliation in its potential for uncertainty in the fact or
extent 0f harm, for almost every tort can present the same uncertainty.” Id. (citing dissenting
opinion of Justice Kennard in Temple Community Hospital).
Using a fairly similar analysis as Connecticut, and referencing at least twelve other states
that have adopted a third party spoliation of evidence claim, the neighboring state 0f Utah has
also recognized an independent claim for third party spoliation of evidence. Hills v. United
Parcel Service, Ina, 232 P.3d 1049, 1053-58 (Utah 2010) (See ft. 2 for a recitation 0f decisions
from twelve states in alphabetical order). In reviewing the twenty—five year history and
treatment of the issue in numerous jurisdictions throughout the country, the Utah Supreme Court
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suggests a “general pattern” trending toward the acceptance of a third party intentional spoliation
0f evidence cause 0f action. Id. at 1056. The Court then proceeds t0 adopt such a cause 0f action
for the State of Utah, finding:
Id.
The preference for a third party spoliation tort is even more defensible. Like most courts,
I (sic) agree that traditional nontort remedies adequately deter first-party spoliation and
fairly compensate Victims. Without creating a new cause 0f action, there are still a
variety of remedies available t0 punish spoliators, deter future spoliators, and protect
nonspoliators prejudiced by evidence destruction. Third party spoliation, however, paints
a different picture. Almost all states—including those that have refused t0 adopt a tort 0f
spoliation-acknowledge that when dealing With third party spoliators, traditional nontort
remedies such as evidentiary inferences, discovery sanctions, and attorney disciplinary
measures are unavailable 0r largely ineffectual. . .Accordingly, While most states have
rejected a cause 0f action for first-party spoliation, nearly all jurisdictions that have
adopted the tort in some form recognize a tort for third party spoliation. In other words, if
a state were t0 adopt any form 0f spoliation tort, it would most likely be a third party
intentional spoliation tort.
Simply put, Idaho would be on solid footing by allowing a third party intentional
spoliation of evidence claim to move forward in this case. The so-called downsides 0f such a
claim and availability of alternative remedies to address spoliation cited by the California
Supreme Court nearly twenty years ago in Temple County Hospital are in actuality largely
unfounded, easily refuted, and outweighed by the greater good that allowing an independent
claim will achieve. Egregious and intentional wrongful conduct such as the destruction and
tampering 0f evidence by a third party that protects a wrong doer from liability should be
frowned upon, results in harm, and should therefore be actionable.
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III. The Appellant has Plead a Valid and Justified Claim for Negligent and/or
Intentional Spoliation of Evidence.
Interestingly, in December of 1999, approximately six months after the filing 0f the
Temple County Hospital decision, the Montana Supreme Court issued an opinion of its own
regarding both a third party negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence cause of action.
Oliver v. Stimpson Lumber C0. 297 Mont. 336, 993 P.2d 11 (1999). The Montana Court
provides a solid and reasoned approach that this Court should consider in the crafting of such a
tort in Idaho.
In Oliver, the plaintiff filed a complaint containing an independent cause of action against
his former employer and its insurer for knowingly or negligently altering and discarding a piece
0f equipment that would have been key evidence in a claim the plaintiffwas considering against
a third party for severe personal injuries involving the equipment. Id. at 339-41. The trial court
dismissed the plaintiff” s complaint for both negligent and intentional spoliation, after which the
plaintiff appealed. Id. at 441.
The Oliver Court partially granted the plaintiff’s appeal, but in so doing establishes
elements for a third party cause of action for both a negligent and intentional spoliation 0f
evidence claim. Id. at 347-354. The Court sets forth a well-reasoned basis for allowing such
claims against third parties and why existing remedies are insufficient.
When evidence is in the possession of a third party, however, the various sanctions
available t0 the trial judge are inapplicable and other considerations arise. For instance,
the property in question may be owned by the third party. A property owner normally has
the right to control and dispose 0f his property as he sees fit. The owner 0f the property
may legitimately question What right a plaintiff has t0 direct control over such property.
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Yet, the importance of evidence preservation and the critical importance it plays in the
civil justice system cannot be ignored.
Id. at 345.




existence 0f a potential civil action;
a legal 0r contractual duty t0 preserve evidence relevant to that action;
destruction of that evidence;
significant impairment of the ability t0 prove the potential civil action;
a causal connection between the destruction of the evidence and the inability t0
prove the lawsuit;
a significant possibility of success 0f the potential civil action if the evidence were
available; and
damages.
The Court further delineates the various manners in which a “duty t0 preserve evidence”




the spoliator voluntarily undertakes t0 preserve the evidence and a person
reasonably relies 0n it to his detriment;
the spoliator entered into an agreement t0 preserve the evidence;
there has been a specific request to the spoliator to preserve the evidence; or
there is a duty t0 d0 so based upon a contract, statute, regulation, or some other
special circumstance/relationship.
Noting that the “intentional destruction 0f evidence t0 disrupt 0r defeat another person's
right of recovery is highly improper and cannot be justified,” the Montana Court also provides
elements for an alternative claim for a third party intentional spoliation 0f evidence claim:
1.
9°.“
the existence of a potential lawsuit;
the defendant's knowledge 0f the potential lawsuit;
the intentional destruction 0f evidence designed t0 disrupt 0r defeat the potential
lawsuit;
disruption of the potential lawsuit;
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If Idaho follows these elements, then the Appellant has adequately plead a claim for both
negligent and/or intentional spoliation 0f evidence. As the public agency charged With the
investigation into the accident that caused the death of Raymond’s father Barry Johnson, the ISP
had either voluntarily taken on the duty, or had some regulatory or statutory duty to preserve
evidence With regard t0 such investigation. Without question, there existed the potential of a
wrongful death lawsuit related to such investigation. Raymond alleges that the ISP superiors and
agents engaged in a number of destructive and damaging actions that destroyed and/or tampered
With key evidence, in particular findings by the initial ISP investigators that the deputy that
caused the accident acted recklessly and that alcohol use by Mr. Johnson was not a factor.
Raymond also alleges that the ISP’S outrageous conduct related to criminal proceedings
prevented felony negligence charges from being pursued against the deputy that would have
resulted in per se liability against the deputy and his employer in her case. Without question, a
criminal conviction against the deputy and/or an untampered and unimpeded investigatory report
from the ISP would have been crucial evidence for Raymond’s wrongful death claim. Instead
the ISP’S actions caused significant delays and made Raymond’s claim much more difficult to
prove than it should have been. She alleges damages caused by such actions (as discussed in
detail supra in Section V). Thus, even if the ISP did not “intend” t0 destroy 0r tamper with
evidence, it violated duties t0 preserve such evidence — therefore resulting in a negligent
spoliation 0f evidence claim.
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Raymond has also clearly plead a claim for “intentional” spoliation 0f evidence under the
Montana standard, a claim Which has fewer elements because 0f the inherently “impropriety” 0r
egregiousness of such conduct. She alleges that the ISP engaged in measures to protect the
deputy and his employer from liability, by purposefully tampering With and destroying key
evidence that would have been crucial to her wrongful death claims. Again, although much of
the ISP’S wrongful conduct was geared toward shielding the deputy from criminal liability, the
ISP should have easily foreseen that such conduct would “disrupt” or “defeat” Raymond’s
liability claims in her civil lawsuit. Hence, such actions rise t0 the level 0f “intentional”
spoliation 0f evidence. Raymond alleges real damages as a result 0f such conduct, discussed
supra in Section V.
In sum, While the district court declined t0 appropriately and fully consider Whether Idaho
has or should recognize a spoliation claim for the ISP’S egregious conduct, nothing prevents this
Court on a de nova review from allowing such a claim as applied to the allegations in this case.
In so doing, this Court will not be on untrodden ground, but has sound principles and precedent
to draw upon from nearby jurisdictions to support such a claim.
IV. The Respondent’s Alleged Immoral Conduct and the Severity 0f the Harm t0
Appellant Rises t0 the Level 0f a “Prima Facia” Tort under Restatement§ 870.
It may be possible that the Appellant’s claims d0 not neatly fit within a spoliation 0f
evidence claim 0r that some of the wrongful conduct committed by the Respondent is not
necessarily related t0 destruction 0r tampering of evidence. As such, this Court should consider
Whether an additional 0r separate tort claim should be permitted under § 870 0f the Restatement
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ofLaw Which this Court has recognized as a “catch all” provision for un-traditional categories 0f
tort. Rest. Torts, 2nd § 870. (See, Yoakum 129 Idaho at 178, 923 P.2d at 423).
The Respondent’s response t0 the Appellant’s arguments 0n the application 0f § 870
again leans heavily 0n the Temple Coumjy Hospital decision and attempts t0 downplay 0r
disregard much 0f the Appellant’s allegations — passing them off as “vague.” This response is
lacking and does not truly refute the points made by the Appellant 0n this issue. The multitude
of reasons why this Court should not follow Temple County Hospital are discussed at length in
Section II infra. However, given the unique and unusual considerations at play, the Appellant
hereby provides additional basis and support for why the Court should allow such a tort in this
case.
The inclusion 0f § 870 t0 the Restatement 0fTorts 2nd is the culmination 0f the evolution
0f common law, legal trends, and policy considerations. For a thorough and excellent recitation
of the history 0f this tort, see “Concurring Opinion Appendix A” t0 Missouri Court 0fAppeals
Southern District, Second Division decision Billingsley v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance
C0., SD35102 (dec. June 18, 2018). Historically, it has been referred to as a “prima facie” tort
Which has its roots in a 1904 United States Supreme Court Opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 25 S.Ct. 3, 49 L.Ed. 154 (1904). As
conceptualized by Holmes: "Prima facie, the intentional infliction 0f temporal damages is a
cause 0f action Which as a matter 0f substantive law, Whatever may be the form 0f the pleading,
requires a justification if the defendant is to escape." Id. Holmes also refers t0 the notion 0f
"disinterested malevolence" or When ordinarily lawful conduct that in actuality was not done t0
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achieve a beneficial end for the actor but was done solely with a malevolent intent to injure the
plaintiff, the conduct became actionable. Id.
After the Aikens decision, the concept of a prima facie tort developed in various forms
and reservations, with § 870 0f the Restatement (drafted in 1977) representing an attempt to
resolve and “balance the interests.” Id. See comments c., d. and e. The Restatement comments
recommend that in determining whether a prima facia tort exists, the court balances the “harms
that individuals must bear as the price 0f living in a society composed With many individuals” for
Which there is n0 cause 0f action with “other types 0fharm are just as clearly entitled t0 the
protection of the law.” Id. comment f.
The “severity” 0f the harm, including the “significance 0f the emotional harm” is an
“important consideration” in this balancing test. Id. The “motive” and “means” 0f the defendant
is also “a very important factor,” in particular the “moral and legal character” 0f the conduct. Id.
comment h. “If the means is illegal or unfair 0r immoral according to the common
understanding 0f society this constitutes a factor favoring liability.” Id.
The allegations in this case d0 clearly meet the requisite threshold for a prima facia tort.
The allegations, if true, show that instead 0fpromoting and enforcing the law as it is charged and
obligated to d0, the state’s chief law enforcement agency ISP instead prevented justice and
protected a law breaker. More disconcerting is that the person the ISP was protecting was acting
in his capacity as a law enforcement officer when he broke the law. In other words, the ISP’S
actions put itself and the interests of another law enforcement officer in the course of duty above
the law. Indeed it is difficult t0 envision a more “immoral” and “unfair” act in societ .5
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The severity of the harm to the Appellant Raymond is also readily apparent. Instead of
being able t0 rely and trust upon the ISP to properly conduct its investigation into the culpability
of the person who killed her father, the agency did the opposite. The consequences to Raymond
are crushing, not only in terms 0f her right to obtain justice and compensation for the loss of her
father, but the enormous emotional toll on her. Instead 0f being able t0 pursue a fairly straight
forward wrongful death claim in which liability is clear, she finds herself up against the power
and weight 0f the state’s police force, which would much prefer t0 protect the person Who killed
her father than allow her justice. The natural result for any person in this situation would likely
be severe anxiety and depression caused by this upside-down approach by law enforcement. The
loss of faith and confidence in law enforcement would be a source of grief and fear in itself. As
Will be discussed further supra in Section V, the damages are clear.
In conclusion, as envisioned by the Restatement drafters and the great Justice Holmes, the
law should not allow serious and obviously harmful conduct from being actionable just because a
recognized tort has yet t0 emerge to provide relief for such conduct. There should be no such
“escape” from liability for the wrong-doer. Yet that is precisely What the Respondent is
suggesting this Court do. The Appellant should be allowed t0 proceed with a prima facia tort for
the wrongs blatantly committed by the Respondent.
V. The Respondent’s Inherently Wrongful Conduct, and the Character 0f the
Wrongful Conduct Itself Naturally Results in Damages that Can be Determined
by the Jury.
Respondent also suggests to this Court that the Appellant’s alleged damages cannot be
“proven” and that such damages are “speculative.” Here again, the Respondent is attempting to
take advantage 0f the uncertainty caused by its own actions t0 avoid liability. Additionally,
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Respondent is disregarding basic concepts of types of damages that have been plead and are
allowed for the caused harms.
In this case, the Appellant is seeking both special, general and compensatory damages.
“Special damages” arise from “the special circumstances 0f the case” which the law “presumes
0r implies from the mere invasion 0f the plaintiff” s rights.” 22 Am Jur 2d Damages § 43.
General damages are those “that are the natural and necessary result of the wrongful act or
omission asserted as the foundation 0f liability. In other words, general damages are those Which
are traceable t0, and probably the necessary result 0f, the injury.” 22 Am Jur 2d Damages § 42.
Finally, “compensatory damages” compensate pecuniary losses, not only for losses that have
occurred, but future losses. 22 Am Jur 2d Damages § 29. Such damages also include “wounded
feelings and mental anguish” and under such non-economic losses. Id.
As it applies t0 spoliation claims and prima facia torts, due to the nature of such torts,
Wide latitude is given to the jury t0 ascertain such damages. The general policy for such an
approach is explained by the United States Supreme Court which suggests that the inability to
prove precise damages due t0 the “nature 0f the tort” should not prevent wrongdoer from
“making amends” for his wrongful acts:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment 0f the amount 0f
damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles ofjustice t0
deny all relief t0 the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any
amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere
speculation or guess, it Will be enough if the evidence show the extent 0f the damages as
a matter ofjust and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness
and precision that would be possible if the case, Which he alone is responsible for
making, were otherwise. . .As the Supreme Court 0f Michigan has forcefully declared, the
risk of the uncertainty should be thrown upon the wrongdoer, instead of upon the injured
party. . .Juries are allowed t0 act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF - 18
positive, proof. And when, from the nature of the case, the amount 0f the damages cannot
be estimated With certainty, or only a part of them can be so estimated, we can see no
obj ection to placing before the jury all the facts and circumstances 0f the case having any
tendency t0 show damages, 0r their probable amount; so as t0 enable them t0 make the
most intelligible and probable estimate which the nature 0f the case Will permit. . .To deny
the injured party the right t0 recover any actual damages in such cases, because they are
0f a nature which cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties t0 profit
by, and speculate upon, their own wrongs, encourage Violence, and invite depredation.
Such is not, and cannot be, the law, though cases may be found Where courts have laid
down artificial and arbitrary rules Which have produced such a result. Whatever of
uncertainty there may be in this mode of estimating damages is an uncertainty caused by
the defendant's own wrongful act, and justice and sound public policy alike require that
he should bear the risk 0f the uncertainty thus produced.
Story Parchment C0. v. Paterson Parchment Paper C0., 51 S.Ct. 248, 250-51, 282 U.S. 555,
564-65 75 (193 1) (citations omitted).
Jurisdictions that have adopted a spoliation 0f evidence cause 0f action have followed
this approach. Such justification is well stated by the Montana Supreme Court in Stimpson:
Generally, a plaintiff is required t0 prove damages with reasonable certainty. However,
we have previously stated that When there is strong evidence of the fact 0f damage, a
defendant should not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be proven
with precision. . .The speculative nature of damages is inherent in the uncertainties 0f
proof relevant to the tort of spoliation of evidence. Thus, the interest of the plaintiff to
recover the entire amount of damages that he would have received if the underlying
action had been pursued successfully must be balanced with the defendant's interest in
not providing the plaintiff with a windfall. The plaintiff should not be allowed to benefit
more from the spoliation than he would have in the underlying suit. On the other hand,
the defendant should be adequately punished for his offending conduct and should be
required to adequately compensate the plaintiff for the loss of his ability to pursue the
underlying suit.
Stimpson at 351.
In essence, this Court should not excuse the Respondent’s alleged wrongful conduct,
Which in itself, resulted in an uncertainty 0f damages. That would be a perverse application of
the law. Additionally, Appellant has plead a number of non-economic damages including
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emotional distress, anguish and so forth resulting from the Respondent’s conduct which has
always been recognized by Idaho as allowable damages.
In regard to the loss 0f value t0 a prospective claim resulting by spoliation of evidence,
the Montana Court has suggested a formula that balances the uncertainties:
In taking these interests into consideration, it is necessary for the damages t0 be discounted
to account for the uncertainties. Therefore, we hold that damages arrived at through
reasonable estimation based on relevant data should be multiplied by the significant
possibility that the plaintiffwould have won the underlying suit had the spoliated evidence
been available. For example, if a jury determined that the expected recovery in the
underlying suit was $200,000 and that there was an estimated 6O percent possibility that
the plaintiff would have recovered that amount in the underlying suit had it not been
impaired by the spoliated evidence, then the award 0f damages would be $120,000 (6O
percent 0f $200,000).
Stimpson at 351-52.
There is no reason that a similar approach could not be taken in the Appellant’s case,
despite the fact that the underlying case has been resolved. If Appellant can prove that the
Respondent did in fact interfere With, destroy 0r otherwise tamper With the evidence in her cause
(0r any other such prima facia tort), there is nothing that prevents a jury from determining the
value 0f her claim had the wrongful conduct not occurred. Indeed, a jury is routinely requested
to determine pecuniary amounts based upon less than complete facts. An appropriate jury
instruction can be formulated that balances all of the interests and uncertainties.
Additionally, the questions regarding damages for the Appellant’s loss of claim are not as
complex and uncertain as the Respondent is leading the Court to believe. Raymond simply
needs to show what the evidence would have been had the ISP not engaged in its wrongful and
tortious conduct. With an untainted investigatory report showing reckless behavior that caused
the death of Mr. Johnson, liability would have been clear. The jury would simply need t0
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determine What the damages would have been if liability were clearly established. This is a
question well within the province 0f a jury. Moreover, damages could be appropriately awarded
for the delays — including statutory interest. Given the passage 0f time in this case, this Will not
be an unsubstantial amount.
Finally, as overlooked by the Respondent, the Respondent has alleged non-economic and
special damages. As is true in any case, the jury Will consider all of the factors and evidence to
determine an appropriate amount of damages for these types of injuries. The appeal should
therefore be granted.
VI. N0 Basis Exists for the Awarding 0f Respondent’s Attorney Fees.
Respondent has also requested that this Court award its Attorney Fees on appeal. This
request in itself is brought “frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation” pursuant t0 IAR
§ 41. At the very least, the authorities are split 0n the issues presented on appeal and Idaho has
laid the framework and recognized authority for the Appellant’s claims. The Appellant has also
provided ample reason why her damages are not based 0n “speculation” but are inherent within
the claims.
Without citing t0 any authority or any part of the record, Respondent argues that
Appellant’s claims against the ISP have been somehow “litigated” and “settled.” This is a
specious and Wholly un-supported claim. Finally, the Court should note that the Respondent did
not seek nor receive an award 0f attorney fees by the district court for the dismissal 0f the case,
and it is curious as to why it now believes it should be entitled t0 attorney fees 0n appeal.
Simply put, n0 basis exists whatsoever for the awarding 0f Respondent’s attorney fees.
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CONCLUSION
Pursuant t0 the foregoing, this Court should grant Raymond’s appeal and remand the case
for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day 0f May, 2019.
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN
/s/ Nathan M. Olsen
Nathan M. Olsen
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